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Testimonial Statements under Crawford 
WHAT MAKES TESTIMONY . . . TESTIMONIAL? 
Brooks Holland† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Crawford v. Washington,1 the United States Supreme 
Court discarded the reliability framework that had governed 
the admissibility of hearsay statements under the 
Confrontation Clause for more than twenty years.2  In its 
stead, the Court adopted an unforgiving procedural guarantee: 
testimonial hearsay statements by non-testifying declarants 
may not be admitted at trial unless the declarant is 
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.3  The majority in Crawford, however, left 
the precise meaning of “testimonial” statements “for another 
day,”4 casting a shadow of uncertainty over a major component 
of criminal practice.5 
This essay attempts to detangle the concept of 
testimonial statements.  As Mark Dwyer of the New York 
County District Attorney’s Office noted during our conference 
at Brooklyn Law School, my proposed definition may amount to 
mere “wishful thinking.”6  But, it is a definition that makes 
sense to me.  And not just theoretically, but also practically, 
after more than a decade of trying criminal cases. 
  
 † Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law.  
J.D., magna cum laude, Boston University School of Law, 1994.  From 1994 to 2005, 
the author worked as a public defender in New York City. 
 1 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  In an effort to maintain brevity, this essay presumes 
the reader’s basic familiarity with Crawford. 
 2 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 3 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-58, 59, 61, 68. 
 4 Id. at 68. 
 5 See id. at 75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 6 Mark Dwyer, Crawford’s “Testimonial Hearsay” Category: A Plain Limit on 
the Protections of the Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 277, 279 (2005). 
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II. DEFINING TESTIMONY 
Crawford offers a lot of cryptic clues about what 
“testimonial” may mean – historical clues, terminological clues, 
governmental “abuse” clues, and three oft-cited definitional 
clues.7  Yet, as the diversity of judicial decisions interpreting 
Crawford demonstrates,8 Crawford fails to identify a clear 
commonality to “testimony” that accurately defines when a 
statement is “testimonial” instead of something else that is 
produced when a person speaks about facts or opinions.  
History may play an important role in revealing this 
commonality, as a panel at our conference discussed in detail.  
I will suggest a couple of additional questions that perhaps 
should weigh upon this historical analysis.  My main goal here, 
however, will be to define testimony from my practical 
perspective of having spent the last eleven years as a criminal 
defense attorney observing, producing and cross-examining 
witness testimony.  The hope is not to argue the testimonial 
status of every common type of hearsay statement, but rather 
to identify a core ingredient of testimony that may serve as a 
broad guide to resolving these questions. 
A. Looking to History to Define Testimony 
The discussion of history’s role in shaping confrontation 
doctrine raises two questions for me.  The first relates to the 
“not enough like Raleigh” approach to testimonial statements.  
Crawford, of course, treated us to a detailed historical backdrop 
to the adoption of the Confrontation Clause.  This backdrop 
focused on several high-profile political trials during 16th, 17th 
and 18th century England and colonial times,9 especially the 
treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, which the Court 
characterized as “a paradigmatic confrontation violation.”10 
Raleigh’s alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham, did not testify at 
Raleigh’s trial and thus could not be cross-examined, as 
Raleigh demanded.  Instead, Cobham’s statements were taken 
ex parte by an investigating “Privy Council” prior to trial, and 
his accusations were presented at trial in hearsay form.  The 
  
 7 See generally State v. Davis, 613 S.E.2d 760, 766-68 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 8 See id. at 768-79 (cataloguing decisions); see also Jeffrey L. Fisher, 
Crawford v. Washington: Reframing the Right to Confrontation, http://www.dwt.com/ 
lawdir/publications/CrawfordOutline.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2005). 
 9 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-50. 
 10 Id. at 52. 
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Court in Crawford identified this “civil-law mode of criminal 
procedure” as the “principal evil at which the Confrontation 
Clause was directed.”11  And since Crawford, some courts have 
seized upon the Raleigh paradigm to find hearsay statements 
nontestimonial because they did not sufficiently mirror the 
formality of Cobham’s pre-trial examination or the other 
historical illustrations of civil-law mode pre-trial 
examinations.12 
In today’s era, it is a serious mistake to define the 
prevailing model of criminal practice by the generally 
unrepresentative events of celebrity trials.  And, I gather that 
the Raleigh case was very much the celebrity prosecution of its 
day, as were the other political trials discussed in Crawford.  
So, maybe the question should be asked, were run-of-the-mill 
ex parte witness examinations in the Raleigh era really that 
formal? I do not know the answer.  The comments of some of 
our conference panelists, however, suggest that they may not 
have been.  So if, for example, the typical historical ex parte 
witness examination more routinely involved a citizen-initiated 
complaint,13 brought to the local farmer-by-day-justice-of-the-
peace-by-night, under relatively informal circumstances, post-
Crawford courts may have been basing confrontation decisions 
on a flawed expectation of formality generated by a historical 
version of the O.J. trial.  Either way, none of the courts 
decreeing “not enough like Raleigh” has explored whether the 
formal nature of Cobham’s examination in Raleigh accurately 
depicts the prevailing day-to-day criminal practice of the time, 
and if not, whether this fact alters the historical analysis. 
My second question concerns what this prevailing 
historical practice should tell us about modern criminal 
practice.  Some courts have determined that the historical 
practice targeted by the Confrontation Clause informs us of the 
degree of formality we should expect from a modern criminal 
  
 11 Id. at 50. 
 12 See, e.g., People v. Jimenez, No. B164534, 2004 WL 1832719, at *11-12 
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2004) (unpublished), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1713 (2005); People 
v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 856-57 (Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that “[w]e cannot 
believe that the framers would have seen a ‘striking resemblance’ between Deputy 
Mullin’s interview with John at the hospital and a justice of the peace’s pretrial 
examination”), rev. granted and op. superseded by, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004). 
 13 Cf. Richard D. Friedman, The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and 
Transformed, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 439, 458 (2004) (noting that “in older 
systems . . . there was no public prosecutor, and victims or their families prosecuted 
crimes themselves”). 
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investigation before it will produce a testimonial statement.14  
But, this view focuses on the circumstances surrounding an 
out-of-court statement instead of the trial at which it is offered, 
which for confrontation purposes may be asking the wrong 
question.  Rather, the more germane question may be whether 
the shift away from the civil-law mode of procedure to the 
confrontation model reflected in the Sixth Amendment 
effectively ended the historical practice of admitting out-of-
court statements at trial by non-testifying declarants.  Or, did 
a robust practice of admitting such statements still persist 
except for the very formalized types of pre-trial statements 
illustrated by the Raleigh case? If the latter is true, then the 
many post-Crawford decisions admitting substantial hearsay 
as “not enough like Raleigh” may be on the right track. 
But, from the comments of our panelists who study this 
history, I suspect that the former is more likely.  If so, modern 
courts may be ignoring the proper historical emphasis: by 
constitutionally eliminating the “principle evil” illustrated by 
the Raleigh case, the Framers established an historical practice 
model that resulted in few, if any, out-of-court statements by 
non-testifying declarants being admitted at trial.15  If history is 
indeed to guide us, a broad modern hearsay exception should 
not unseat this constitutionally enshrined practice model, 
“even if that exception might be justifiable in other 
circumstances.”16 Instead, in defining “testimonial,” and 
thereby setting the primary if not exclusive scope of 
confrontation rights, we should view our modern criminal 
practices through the lens of this historical practice model that 
permitted few if any out-of-court statements by non-testifying 
declarants at trial.  Otherwise, despite our asserted fidelity to 
history, we risk establishing a modern criminal practice model 
  
 14 See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 12. 
 15 Cf. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (explaining that “[t]he common-law tradition 
is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing, while the civil law 
condones examination in private by judicial officers”);  id. at 56 n.6, 58 n.8 (noting that 
few, if any, modern hearsay exceptions were recognized in 1791, with the exception of 
the dying declaration exception and perhaps a very circumscribed version of the 
spontaneous declaration exception).  Cf. also, e.g., Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 
799, 808 (D.C. 2005) (discussing modern expansion of excited utterance hearsay 
exception), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 878 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 2005); Richard D. 
Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1209-24 
(2002) (surveying historical development of excited utterance exception).  But cf. People 
v. Rincon, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 858 (Ct. App. 2005) (claiming that elements of 
California’s spontaneous statement exception “are largely identical to the common law 
hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations as described in Crawford”). 
 16 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7. 
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that at the stage where confrontation matters – trial – looks 
nothing like what the Framers created for themselves. 
B. Testimony:  Part of a Process 
In Crawford, the Supreme Court told us that testimony 
typically means “a solemn declaration or affirmation made for 
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”17  This 
definition, however, raises more questions than it answers.  
Even with the three oft-cited formulations of testimony 
outlined in Crawford,18 not only did the Court mysteriously 
decline to adopt any of them, it also failed to articulate the 
“common nucleus” that they all supposedly share.19  The 
Court’s practical illustrations also failed to clarify the meaning 
of testimony, as the Court offered only the obvious extremes of 
the testimonial spectrum: traditional courtroom testimony and 
custodial police interrogations on the one hand, and a casual or 
off-hand remark to an acquaintance on the other.20 
The Court simply did not tell us what feature, other 
than our ingrained assumptions, makes the former statements 
testimonial but the latter nontestimonial, so that we can know 
what to do with the statements in between.  Is the 
determinative factor the formal judicial or quasi-judicial 
circumstances surrounding the statement when made?  The 
nature or degree of any interrogation by the questioner?  The 
involvement of a government actor in producing the statement?  
The questioner’s purpose in interrogating the declarant?  The 
declarant’s subjective awareness of any or all of these facts? 
My experience tells me that while these factors all can 
bear on the ultimate question of whether a statement 
constitutes testimony, none is a necessary ingredient to it.  
Rather, the common ingredient to testimony that I consistently 
have observed is notice, or foreseeability, to a declarant that 
his or her statement will contribute to a formal decision-
making process.  Factors like formality, interrogation, and 
questioner or declarant intent all matter, but only because they 
may demonstrate this foreseeability, not because any one factor 
or combination of factors necessarily defines testimony.  An 
exploration of these factors should illustrate. 
  
 17 Id. at 51 (internal citations omitted). 
 18 See id. at 51-52. 
 19 See id. at 52. 
 20 See id. at 51-52, 68. 
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1.   Formality & Foreseeability 
Emphasizing Crawford’s admonition that “[a]n accuser 
who makes a formal statement . . . bears testimony,”21 several 
courts have placed heavy emphasis on whether an out-of-court 
statement was given under particularly formal circumstances 
in determining whether it proves to be testimonial.22  Many of 
these formality lines drawn by lower courts, however, strike me 
as arbitrary and disconnected from any meaningful conception 
of testimony – such as the line that makes narrative, 
accusatory statements to police officers at a precinct 
sufficiently formal, but the very same statements to the very 
same officers on the street or at a hospital, or through 911, 
insufficiently so.23 
Perhaps the mistake rests in focusing on the formality 
of the circumstances surrounding an out-of-court statement 
when it is uttered instead of the formal purpose to which the 
statement will be put.  “Testimony” cannot conceptually be 
divorced from the broader purpose that it serves and that 
distinguishes it from mere words.  Testimony at its core 
contributes to formal fact resolution, and consequently, to a 
formal decision-making process.24  This process frequently is 
fluid and multi-layered, running in a criminal case, for 
instance, from the decision to arrest and charge, to a 
preliminary hearing and grand jury proceedings, to pre-trial 
hearings and the trial itself, and sometimes even to post-
conviction proceedings.  Witness statements guide these very 
formal decisions throughout the adjudicative process.  To freeze 
  
 21 Id. at 51 (emphasis added). 
 22 See, e.g., People v. Ferrell, No. B172129, 2005 WL 977609, at *12 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Apr. 28, 2005) (unpublished); People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 775-77 (Ct. 
App. 2004); People v. Jimenez, No. B164534, 2004 WL 1832719, at *11-12 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Aug. 17, 2004); Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 951-52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), 
aff’d, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005); Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 963-64 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2004), aff’d, 829 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005); State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 305 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005). 
 23 See, e.g., Jimenez, 2004 WL 1832719, at *11-12 (street); People v. Lennon, 
No. B169775, 2005 WL 957751, at *11-13 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2005) (unpublished) 
(hospital); People v. Coleman, 791 N.Y.S.2d 112, 114 (App. Div. 2005) (911 call).  Cf. 
State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 855 (Wash. 2005) (Sanders, J., dissenting) (noting lack of 
coherence to majority’s theory of testimony that holds the complainant’s most 
incriminating statements during a 911 call to be nontestimonial, while identifying 
other portions of the same call as testimonial). 
 24 Although confrontation interests are invoked by testimony, the purpose of 
testimony must be considered discretely from the purposes of confrontation.  
Confrontation refines the presentation of testimony; it does not itself define testimony.  
See Friedman, supra note 13, at 441-43 (discussing purposes behind confrontation). 
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an out-of-court statement in its static surrounding 
environment, therefore, when considering whether it is 
testimonial in character artificially removes the statement 
from the broader process of fact adjudication that gives 
testimony its defining character.25  The question of formality 
instead needs to be more forward-looking so as to account for 
this ongoing decision-making process. 
Of course, the formality of the surrounding environment 
often will alert a declarant to the formal decision-making 
purpose reserved for his or her statement, and thus, these 
factors remain relevant.  A person making statements to a 
grand jury, for example, has notice from that environment 
alone that this judicial body will use the statements for a 
formal adjudicative purpose.  But even in a traditional 
testimonial setting like the grand jury, testimony does not 
derive its character from the contemporaneous externalities 
that surround it, but rather from its role in this process of 
formal fact adjudication – such as the grand jury’s decision 
whether to indict, a formal decision that certainly does not 
happen contemporaneously with the giving of testimony. 
The absence of terribly formal circumstances 
surrounding a statement, therefore, should not become a 
superficial talisman for nontestimonial hearsay rulings.  The 
determinative question instead should be whether the 
surrounding circumstances notified the declarant of the formal 
adjudicative process to which the statement will contribute, for 
a statement’s contribution to that process sits at the heart of its 
character as testimony – and of the need for confrontation if it 
is offered at trial.  This question asks more than just a long-
winded version of the third formulation of testimony suggested 
in Crawford: “statements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe 
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”26 
It recognizes that testimony contributes to a broader and more 
fluid process than just the end-game of trial where 
confrontation is implicated, and that the concept of testimony 
therefore cannot be restricted solely to consideration of its use 
  
 25 Cf. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (2004) (defining testimony broadly as a 
statement “made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact”). 
 26 Id. at 52. 
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at the adversarial stage of the adjudicative process requiring 
confrontation.27 
This view of testimony, moreover, means a declarant 
need not necessarily anticipate or have an interest in 
advancing the adjudicative process.28  In my experience, 
traditional witnesses testify with a wide range of awareness, 
expectations and interests, varying from fully engaged to 
totally out of it.  The exact rate and degree of these subjective 
considerations is really irrelevant, because we do not test 
courtroom witnesses on them before they are asked to give 
testimony.29  Instead, it is the notice on which traditional 
witnesses are placed of the formal decision-making purpose 
reserved for their statements that makes them “witnesses” who 
“testify.” This notice fairly creates the external expectation that 
a witness, for better or worse, will appreciate this formal 
purpose and that his or her statements thus will be subject to 
adversarial testing.30  The standard should prove no different 
with out-of-court testimony. 
  
 27 Indeed, nothing about the concept of testimony indicates that it should be 
restricted to statements made in furtherance of a criminal prosecution, and I have seen 
no meaningful definitional distinction between civil and criminal “testimony.”  Cf. 
United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 348-49 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that whether the 
witness’ sworn civil deposition “is ‘testimonial’ as Crawford used that term is 
uncertain”); United States v. Moffie, No. 1:04 CR 567, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9462, at 
*22-23 (N.D. Ohio May 11, 2005).  Cf. also Richard D. Friedman et al., Listening to 
Crawford 1 (Feb. 15, 2005) (unpublished article, available at 
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2005/02/case-of-censorship.html) (arguing that a 
person testifies when he or she “states information to a person of authority or 
otherwise makes a statement that a reasonable person would understand will likely be 
used for evidentiary purposes” (emphasis added)); but cf. Richard D. Friedman, 
Grappling with the Meaning of Testimonial 8 (Feb. 16, 2005) (draft, available at 
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2005/02/grappling-with-meaning-of-
testimonial.html) (noting that “anticipation of use in prosecution is the key question in 
determining whether a statement is testimonial” (emphasis added)). 
 28 Cf., e.g., United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(reasoning that “Crawford at least suggests that the determinative factor in 
determining whether a declarant bears testimony is the declarant’s awareness or 
expectation that his or her statements may later be used at a trial”); State v. Hembertt, 
696 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Neb. 2005) (holding that “[t]he inquiry is whether . . . the 
declarant intended to bear testimony against the accused,” and thus, “[t]he 
determinative factor in determining whether a declarant bears testimony is the 
declarant’s awareness or expectation that his or her statements may later be used at a 
trial”). 
 29 Cf. State v. Krasky, 696 N.W.2d 816, 827 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (Crippen, 
J., dissenting) (explaining that “the notion of an inquiry on the sophistication of the 
declarant might reasonably be abandoned due [to] its inevitable absurdity”); In re 
Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183, 189 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
 30 In most traditional testimonial settings, this notice is established first and 
foremost by administration of an oath.  Once a witness has sworn or affirmed to tell the 
truth, what the witness actually expects or desires about the role of his or her 
statements becomes irrelevant, as the oath creates our external expectation that the 
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Therefore, I would suggest that Crawford’s “formality” 
analysis properly should be an objective, forward-looking one: 
Did the circumstances surrounding the out-of-court statement 
make its formal, adjudicative use foreseeable to the declarant?31 
If so, the out-of-court witness as much as the in-court witness 
speaks with the external expectation that his or her statements 
will affect this process, and thus must be treated accordingly – 
as testimony, and not simply mere words. 
This foreseeability should not be obviated by an out-of-
court witness’ excitement or stress, contrary to the view of 
several post-Crawford courts.32  Witnesses testify in courtrooms 
every day while experiencing tremendous stress, excitement, 
anxiety and every other form of emotion that might still their 
capacity for reflection and contrivance.  Yet, we do not declare 
adversarial testing of their statements unnecessary, because 
these witnesses nevertheless remain on notice of the formal use 
intended for their statements sufficient to prompt our external 
expectation that these statements will be weighed and tested 
as testimony.  A witness’ demeanor and emotional state simply 
become factors to be considered when his or her testimony is 
weighed in the decision-making process.  No different analysis 
should apply to out-of-court statements that happen to qualify 
as excited utterances, except perhaps for truly spontaneous, 
exclamatory statements that fall closer to the narrow 
spontaneous declaration exception that may have existed in 
  
witness will testify accordingly. As Crawford suggests, however, while administration 
of an oath certainly bespeaks of testimony, it is not a precondition to testimony if other 
circumstances fairly create the same testimonial expectations.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 52 n.3. 
 31 Cf. Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 558 (Mass. 2005) 
(adopting “a formulation that would find testimonial all statements the declarant knew 
or should have known might be used to investigate or prosecute an accused” (second 
emphasis added)). 
 32 See, e.g., United States v. Brun, 416 F.3d 703, 707 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(concluding that “the statements of an adolescent boy who has called 911 while 
witnessing an argument between his aunt and her partner escalate to assault would be 
emotional and spontaneous rather than deliberate and calculated. We hold that [the 
declarant’s] 911 call was an excited utterance, and under these circumstances, 
nontestimonial” (citation omitted)); United States v. Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 179 n.3 
(1st Cir. 2005) (reasoning that “the excited utterance of fourteen-year-old Camacho as 
he flagged down Officer Thornton immediately following the incident clearly does not 
fall within the meaning of testimonial hearsay as it is used Crawford”); State v. Banks, 
No. 03AP-1286, 2004 WL 2809070, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2004) (holding that 
“Crawford only applies to statements that . . . are not subject to common-law 
exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as excited utterance”).  See generally Anderson v. 
State, 111 P.3d 350, 354 n.26 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (cataloguing additional 
authorities). 
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1791.33  These latter statements remain so interconnected to 
the factual incident being referenced that future use of the 
statements simply no longer proves foreseeable.34 
2.   Interrogation & Questioner Intent 
This forward-looking view of “formality” also means that 
“interrogation” of one form or another should not dictate 
whether a statement is testimonial.  At trial, direct 
examination tends to involve open-ended questions like “what 
happened,” while cross-examination involves leading questions.  
Answers to both are surely witness testimony.  Indeed, some of 
the most effective examinations of trial witnesses I have seen 
are when a lawyer asks very few open-ended questions, with 
the witness so well prepared and aware of his or her role that 
“structured” interrogation becomes unnecessary for effective 
testimony.  Why should a different standard apply to out-of-
court witnesses, requiring “structured” interrogation as a 
precondition to testimony?35 To testify, of course, a witness 
  
 33 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004).  Cf. Bockting v. 
Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2005) (Noonan, J., concurring) (criticizing 
admission of declarant’s statement under Crawford even though “[i]t may have been an 
excited or spontaneous utterance”); Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 807-15 (D.C. 
2005) (noting broad modern expansion of historical spontaneous declaration hearsay 
exception and concluding that “the findings necessary to support a conclusion that a 
statement was an excited utterance do not conflict with those that are necessary to 
support a conclusion that it was testimonial . . . under Crawford, reliability has no 
bearing on the question of whether a statement was testimonial”), vacated, reh’g en 
banc granted, 878 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 2005); Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 699-700 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that “we do not think that excited utterances can be 
automatically excluded from the class of testimonial statements”); Gonsalves, 833 
N.E.2d at 559 (concluding that “a statement can be both testimonial in nature and a 
spontaneous utterance . . . . Nothing in Crawford indicates the two are mutually 
exclusive. In fact, quite the contrary. In dicta in a footnote, the Court suggested such 
utterances can be testimonial, depending on the applicable State’s hearsay law”); State 
v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1263-66 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that while “[t]he trial 
judge characterized [the 911] call as an excited utterance . . . based on indicia of 
reliability and trustworthiness, Crawford clearly rejects the admission of testimonial 
statements based on ‘the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous 
notions of ‘reliability’’”).  Cf. generally State v. Branch, 865 A.2d 673 (N.J. 2005) 
(severely restricting scope of New Jersey’s excited utterance hearsay exception to 
conform to its narrow historical form and justification); State v. Cotto, 865 A.2d 660 
(N.J. 2005) (same). 
 34 For an example of an arguably nontestimonial excited utterance, albeit 
under a different analysis, see People v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Sup. Ct. 2004). 
 35 See, e.g., People v. Bradley, 799 N.Y.S.2d 472, 476-77 (App. Div. 2005) 
(evaluating responding police officer’s question of “what happened” and concluding that 
“[e]ven assuming that the circumstances under which the statement was obtained can 
be considered an ‘interrogation,’ they are hardly comparable to the ‘structured 
interrogation’ found to be subject to the Confrontation Clause in Crawford,” which the 
court characterized as “detailed, particularized and memorialized questioning”); State 
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must be doing something more than just yelling into the wind, 
and the manner of an interrogation may signal to the declarant 
what he or she should expect when responding.  But, whether a 
questioner uses open-ended or leading questions, or otherwise 
“interrogates” the declarant in a particularly “structured” 
manner, again seems ancillary to the real question: whether 
the declarant spoke on notice that his or her statements would 
contribute to a formal adjudicative process.36 
This proper focus on the role of interrogation in shaping 
testimony demonstrates why, contrary to some courts’ view, 
“the objective of the person posing the question” does not 
dictate whether the declarant’s response is testimonial.37  For 
instance, in People v. Bradley,38 the court focused on the non-
investigative objectives of a police officer asking a domestic 
violence victim “what happened” in finding her response that 
her boyfriend had thrown her through a glass door 
nontestimonial.39  True, “what happened” is a pretty innocuous 
question that in a complete vacuum may not signal any 
particularly formal adjudicative role for the response.  But, this 
question was not asked in a vacuum in Bradley.  Rather, it was 
asked by a uniformed police officer responding to a 911 call who 
met an injured and bleeding domestic violence victim who 
already had an order of protection against the defendant and 
who accused him of further crimes.40 
Of course, the officer in Bradley did not know all of 
these facts surrounding his question until he asked it and 
received an accusatory response.41  But, the victim did.  And 
these known circumstances should have notified the victim 
  
v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 211 (Me. 2004) (finding complainant’s statements 
nontestimonial because “she was not responding to tactically structured police 
questioning as in Crawford”); Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2004) (opining that “[w]e also believe that ‘interrogation’ carries with it a connotation 
of an at least slightly adversarial setting”), aff’d, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). 
 36 Cf. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 555-57 (rejecting formulaic approach to 
“interrogation,” applying instead “everyday, common understandings of the term, both 
in the general public and the legal community,” and thus viewing answers to police 
questions unrelated to the police “community caretaking function and the need to 
secure a volatile scene” as per se testimonial). 
 37 Bradley, 799 N.Y.S.2d at 480. A definition of testimony that hinges on the 
questioner’s intent also raises concerns about law enforcement’s ability to construct 
questions that strategically ensure that the response is deemed nontestimonial.  See 
Friedman, supra note 13, at 458. 
 38 799 N.Y.S.2d 472 (App. Div. 2005). 
 39 See id. at 474, 477-80. 
 40 See id. at 474-75. 
 41 See id. at 480. 
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that her response would contribute to a formal decision-making 
process, a decisional process that would begin with the officer’s 
response to her accusation.  Indeed, that the officer in Bradley 
may not have drawn any firm conclusions prior to asking “what 
happened” illustrates the testimonial nature of the victim’s 
response, for it informed his formal decision-making just as it 
would have informed a jury’s decision-making if the victim 
instead had given her statement from the witness chair in 
response to a prosecutor asking “what happened.”  The court in 
Bradley improperly ignored this context surrounding the 
victim’s response and its role in the decision-making process, 
and instead isolated the officer’s purpose in asking the question 
to define the response.42  This artificial divorce of question from 
answer does not reflect any real conception of testimony.43 
3.   Governmental “Abuse” 
The Court in Crawford referred to concerns over 
governmental abuse,44 and government actors took the disputed 
statement in Crawford.  Several courts have seemingly read 
these portions of Crawford as a cue to look for governmental 
action in the taking of any challenged statement as a condition 
to it being testimonial. 
Nothing in Crawford, however, indicates that the 
governmental abuse it seeks to prevent, occurs, or only occurs, 
during the taking of statements.45  Indeed, to focus on 
governmental abuse during the taking of a statement rather 
than at its introduction at trial misses the point of 
confrontation.46  Consider a practical illustration.  A colleague 
at my office recently tried a domestic violence case where the 
complainant gave an initial accusatory narrative statement to 
  
 42 See, e.g., id. at 480 (explaining that “[r]ather than attempting to assess the 
expectation of the declarant regarding the probable use of any statement that might be 
forthcoming, the better approach is to evaluate the objective of the person posing the 
question . . . . Thus, [a] response [that] is not the product of a structured police 
interrogation . . . should not be regarded as testimonial”). 
 43 Perhaps this necessary relationship between question and answer to a 
broader understanding of testimony underscores the traditional refrain that trial 
judges offer to juries: a question alone never constitutes testimony; only an answer 
joined with a question creates testimony. 
 44 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004) (expressing 
concern that “[i]nvolvement of government officers in the production of testimony with 
an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse”).  
 45 Cf. id. at 51 (referring generally to “the civil-law abuses the Confrontation 
Clause targeted”). 
 46 Cf. Friedman, supra note 13, at 457-58. 
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responding police officers, but later recanted and did not 
appear at trial.  The prosecution introduced the complainant’s 
initial accusation to the police, which the trial court deemed an 
excited utterance.  No serious effort was made to subpoena the 
complainant for trial, nor did the prosecution allege that the 
defendant improperly procured her recantation, so nothing 
indicated that she in fact was “unavailable” to testify. 
A definition of testimony that focuses on governmental 
“abuse” prior to trial will find none in this case.  The police 
engaged in no abuse by taking the complainant’s ex parte 
statement prior to trial – such interviews are a routine and 
entirely proper part of police investigative work.  Nor did the 
government engage in any abuse by not producing her for 
cross-examination prior to trial – the defendant had no free-
standing constitutional right to pre-trial confrontation.  No 
abuse occurred if the prosecution unilaterally concluded that 
the complainant’s initial accusation provided the most reliable 
account of the defendant’s conduct – prosecutors are charged 
with making exactly this sort of decision as part of the 
adjudicative process. 
Rather, the abuse in this case – and with all similar 
confrontation violations – occurred when the prosecution 
usurped the fact-finding process at trial, and ensured that the 
trial retained an investigative rather than adversarial 
character, by presenting an unchallengeable narrative that 
already had shaped and guided the fact-finding process leading 
to trial, and certainly would at trial as well.  To suggest that 
this role of the complainant’s statements was not foreseeable 
constructs a definition of testimony that simply does not exist 
elsewhere – one that limits consideration of its procedural use 
only to trial and requires the witness to subjectively appreciate 
this narrow role for it.  Any conception of confrontation that 
expresses concern for governmental abuse must focus on 
exactly this type of prosecutorial strategy to sanitize the fact-
finding process at trial.47 
This observation returns me to the concept of testimony 
as contributing to a formal, decision-making process.  Under 
this concept, the governmental status of the interrogator 
should bear on whether a statement proves testimonial only to 
  
 47 Cf. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 2005) (Noonan, J., 
concurring); Brooks Holland, Using Excited Utterances to Prosecute Domestic Violence 
in New York: The Door Opens Wide, or Just a Crack?, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 
199 (2002). 
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the extent that the interrogator’s status makes the statement’s 
injection into this process foreseeable.  To paraphrase 
Crawford itself, a statement to a police officer possesses a 
foreseeable significance to it in this way that a statement to a 
friend usually does not,48 because to most people, the police and 
similar authority figures acting in an investigative capacity 
communicate a clear message: what you say will be included in 
a formal decision-making process.49  For children, however, 
parents and guardians may assume this role as much or even 
more than law enforcement, as perhaps no one is more 
empowered to resolve formal disputes in a child’s mind than 
his or her parent.50  Even a private party such as a medical 
professional may take a testimonial statement, if the 
circumstances demonstrate that this person foreseeably will 
inject the statement into a formal adjudicative process.51  By 
contrast, people speaking in furtherance of a conspiracy or 
completing business records,52 or speaking to an acquaintance 
in private,53 generally have no reason to foresee that their 
statements will contribute to anything beyond their non-
adjudicative function. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The only true commonality that I have observed of all 
“testimony” is the foreseeability of that statement’s 
contribution to a formal, adjudicative process.  In the end, 
therefore, that process is the key to unlocking the meaning of 
testimony, and not artificial notions of formality, statement 
content, witness cognition, interrogation structure or 
  
 48 Cf. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 49 Cf. United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 903-04 (6th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 674-75 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Summers, 414 
F.3d 1287, 1302-03, (10th Cir. 2005); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 
557-59 (Mass. 2005); cf. also United States v. Hinton, No. 03-3803, 2005 WL 2218919, 
at *3-5 (3rd Cir. 2005).  For an interesting example of how witness statements quickly 
may transform from nontestimonial to testimonial in the course of a hectic police 
investigation, see People v. Watson, 798 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (unpublished). 
 50 Cf. In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1034-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005), appeal 
granted, 833 N.E.2d 2 (Ill. 2005); cf. also People v. R.F., 825 N.E.2d 287, 296-99 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2005) (Neville, J., dissenting). 
 51 Cf., e.g., In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 803 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (finding 
statements by complainant to physician during medical evaluation generally 
nontestimonial, except for her identification of defendant as her abuser). 
 52 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. 
 53 Cf. People v. Compan, 100 P.3d 533, 535-38 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. 
granted, No. 04SC422, 2004 WL 2376474 (Colo. Oct. 25, 2004). 
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interrogator status.  A definition of testimony that emphasizes 
this “common nucleus”54 will ensure that the proper range of 
hearsay statements by non-testifying declarants is excluded in 
criminal trials, unless such statements satisfy Crawford’s 
properly unforgiving procedural guarantee.55 
  
 54 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
 55 Or, unless the prosecution can establish that the defendant has forfeited 
any claim to confrontation, a subject beyond the scope of this essay.  For an interesting 
debate on confrontation forfeiture, check out Richard D. Friedman’s blog at 
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com (last visited October 10, 2005). See also State v. 
Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005) (noting the “special concerns” that domestic 
violence cases raise for potential forfeiture by wrongdoing). 
